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The ability of children to perform in estimation-based inference tasks 
was studied in two experiments. In the first study, children in the CA range 
5-7 years were tested for their ability to make increasingly accurate esti- 
mates of proportions as a function of CA. A simple visual judgment task 
which did not involve either verbal stimuli or responses was utilized. It 
was found that there was above-chance level performance at all CA levels 
and that performance improved as a function of CA. In the second stud.!, 
measures of the ability to make quantitative inferences were also studied 
in children in the CA range f%3 years. It was hypothesized that: (1) per- 
formance would be above-chance level at all ages; (2) inferential perform- 
ance would improve with increasing CA; (3) conservatism, defined here as 
the constriction of responses to the middle of the response scale, would 
vary inversely with performance level ; and (4) attention strategies would 
be a significant determiner of performance. All of the hypotheses except (2) 
were supported. The results were discussed in terms of cognitive models 
which consider inference strategies and the role of language in the d:v21011- 
ment of these strategies. The studies provide evidence that accurate but 
nonlogical modes of inference operate in the performance of children within 
the CA range tested. 
The ability to make estimates, whether of size, shape, or relative fre- 
quency, underlies a great deal of everyday behavior. An example of this 
fact has been pointed out by Polyani (1968) : 
The way a judgment of true coherence is arrived at can be seen when 
a jury faces a difficult decision. The jurors may see a pattern of circum- 
stances pointing to the accused. But it is always conceivable that this pat- 
tern may be due to chance. How unlikely a chance should they admit to be 
possible? Or what degree of coincidence should be considered not to bc 
reasonably believable? (p. 28). 
In this study the performances of children at various age levels are 
compared on both a quantitative estimation and a quantitative estima- 
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tion-based inference task. A nonverbal response mode was developed to 
measure performance on a task which involved making judgments about 
visual stimuli which contained an uncertainty component’. Two major 
questions were investigated: the ability of children to form accurate 
and consistent estimates of proportions based on a visual display, and the 
ability to revise estimates based on the presentation of new information. 
In order to reach a decision in uncertain situations an individual must 
be able to formulate and operate upon subjective estimates of likelihoods. 
The development of statistical decision theory has relied heavily on the 
principle that people are capable of dealing in terms of probabilities of 
events (Edwards, 1954; Tanner, 1965; Edwards, Lindman, & Phillips, 
1965). Further evidence shows that perceptual processes may be suscep- 
tible to these same kinds of analyses (Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1960; 
Tanner, Swets, & Green, 1956). At least one approach to language learn- 
ing has taken this probabilistic viewpoint also (Lenneberg, 1957). Sub- 
jective probabilities are, however, only one type of quantitative 
estimation. 
The ability to use imperfectly valid sensory cues in a cue weighting 
task is another instance where the manipulation of quantitative esti- 
mates is required. The utilization of such imperfect cues seems to be a 
well-established capability of human beings (Peterson, Hammond, & 
Summers, 1965; Brunswik, 1939; Wallace, 1941). The importance of 
replicating these results in a variety of experimental contexts to obtain 
“representative” results of natural contexts has been indicated by 
Brunswik (Brunswik, 1947; Brunswik & Herma, 1951). His focus was 
primarily on the acquisition of cues in a given experimenta situation 
while the focus of this study is the development of imperfect cue utiliza- 
tion in children. 
Given that the environment is uncertain and changing, its represen- 
tation must be based on approximation and estimation. It is difficult to 
see how the application of logic, the passing t’o strict conclusions from 
strict premises, is justified in these circumstances. These factors led 
Polyani to underline the necessity of some nonstrict logical structures 
in saying, “that any attempt to eliminate nonstrict modes of inference 
or even to reduce them to insignificance, must be misleading” (1968, 
p. 44). The contention is not that deductive logic operations are irrel- 
evant to human thought, but rather, inappropriate for the complete 
characterization of cognition in uncertain task situations. This perspec- 
tive is somewhat similar to that of probabilistic functionalism (Bruns- 
wik, 1955). It is important, therefore, to trace the development of what 
Polya has termed, “patterns of plausible inference” (1954). Further, it 
is assumed the possession of a skill or concept is not “all-or-none” but a 
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question of degree. To determine the degree to which a subject exhibits 
some behavior, it is necessary that he be able to make more than one 
type of error. The implication for estimation studies, then, is that the 
response repertoire must be greater than two. 
A consideration in the development of a methodology for dealing with 
estimation studies is the role played by language. The difficulties in using 
nonverbal stimuli while retaining a verbal or verbal dependent response 
mode have been pointed out by Tajfel (1963) : 
There would be, no doubt, some difficulties in inferring that . . . children 
are as yet quite incapable of manipulating discontinuous quantities in an 
abstract form. One such difficulty is the inadequacy of verbal instructions 
and questions for eliciting from the child the most effective use of numerical 
concepts which it might already have at its disposal (p. 113). 
Considerable evidence has accumulated supporting the pivotal role 
played by language in the development of higher thought processes 
(Dietze, 1955; Kendler & Kendler, 1961; Luria, 1961; Reese, 1962), It 
seems that by the ages of 5-7 years language plays an important role 
in higher cognitive processes (White, 1965). Therefore, language assumes 
the dual role of methodological and theoretical determinant in the study 
of -higher thought. One immediate implication of this dual role is that 
until the methodological component of language is effectively controlled, 
the theoretical impact of language development will be difficult to assess. 
In an effort to limit the effects of language on the methodological as- 
pects of this study, the stimuli and response materials were nonverbal. 
However, the instruction set was verbal so that some linguistic-based 
variation could have occurred. The necessity of controlling for instruc- 
tional set effects and response learning has been well documented 
(Mandler, 1967; Bruner & Rodriquez, 1953). A training sequence in 
which all subjects had to demonstrate their understanding of the instruc- 
tions and response materials was used to control for response learning 
and instruction variables. 
Two studies were conducted to investigate children’s ability to make 
estimates and inferences. In Study I, three groups of children at CA 
(chronological age) levels 5, 6, and 7 years were tested individually to 
determine the development of the ability to make quantitative estimates. 
In Study II, the hypotheses, based on the results of Study I, were tested 
to investigate the development of the ability to make inference judg- 
ments and to explore the relation between performance and certain fac- 
tors which affect performance in children at CA 6, 7, and 8 years. 
EXPERIMENT I 
The hypotheses were: (1) performance at the CA levels of 5, 6, and 
7 years on a task which requires quantitative estimates of nonverbal 
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visual stimuli is above-chance level; and (2) performance improves as 
a function of increasing CA. The first study was conducted as a necessary 
prerequisite to the study of quantitative inferences in prelogical children. 
Method 
Subjects. Fifty-two children enrolled in a private suburban school in 
Northern Illinois served as subjects. The composition of the three age 
groups was as follows: CA 5.6, 9 males and 7 females; CA 6.5, 10 males 
and 8 females; and CA 7.6, 11 males and 7 females. Intelligence test 
scores were obtained. Mean Kuhlmann-Anderson IQ scores were: CA 
5.6, 107.5; CA 6.5, 111.5; and CA 7.6, 106.5. Subjects were all judged to 
be normal in terms of behavior and personality characteristics. All were 
at the normal grade level except for three who were advanced one grade 
level each. 
Stimulus mater-ids. Visual fields of 100 red and black dots, arranged 
as 10 X 10 arrays were presented on slides. The stimuli varied in the 
number of red dots and the proportions were: .l, .2, .25, .3, .4, .5, .6, .7, 
.75, and .8 red. Slides were projected by a Kodak Carousel projector on 
a screen placed about 10 ft from where the subjects were seated. For all 
but the .2 red stimuli, the colors were randomly interspersed. There were 
three .2 red stimuli, varying in configuration (see Table 1). 
TABLE 1 
FIELD CONFIGURATION OF .2 RED SLIDES” 
S-Design Block design Random 
x00000000x 0000000000 x00000000x 
0x000000x0 0000000000 000000x00x 
00x0000x00 0000000000 oxooxooxoo 
000x00x000 ooxxxxxooo x000000000 
ooooxxoooo ooxxxxxooo 0000000x00 
ooooxxoooo ooxxxxxooo 00000x0x00 
000x00x000 ooxxxxxooo 00x000000x 
00x0000x00 0000000000 x000000000 
0x000000x0 0000000000 00x0x00000 
x00000000x 0000000000 oooooxxxox 
s 0 = Black dot; X = Red dot. 
Response materials. Each subject sat in front of the apparatus pictured 
in Fig. 1. The essential features of the apparatus are: the viewer through 
which a subject sees ten columns of ten dots each, and a lever by which 
the subject can change the proportion of red and black columns appear- 
ing in the viewer. The viewer was 12 X 8 in. The following responses 
were possible with the given apparatus: 0, .l, .2, .3, .4, .5, .6, .7, 3, .9, 
and 1.0 red. 
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FIG. 1. Response apparatus. 
Procedure. The subjects were tested individually. They were instructed 
in the use of the response apparatus until they could use it properly. 
They were then told: 
I f  you are ready, we will begin the game. Shown on the screen in front 
of you will be a picture of red and black dots, just like the ones you see 
in your picture (the viewer). The idea of this game is for you to make 
your picture have just as many red and black dots as there are on the 
screen in front of you. There will be too many dots to count so I don’t 
want you to try. This is a guessing game. Now let’s do some practice ones 
together. 
The training sequence included two slides of each of the following 
proportions, 2, .8, .I, and 1.0 red in a highly ordered configuration. If 
the subject correctly performed the last three of the training sequence, 
the test sequence began, If unsuccessful, then the training sequence was 
repeated until criterion was met. All subjects met criterion. Upon attain- 
mext of criterion subjects were told: 
Now we are going to begin the real game. If  you try hard, you will win 
a prize. Here are the prizes. Would you like to choose one to work for 
now? (Prizes were candy bars, gum, and small toys.) Once again, the idea 
of this game is for you to make your picture have just as many red and 
black dots as there are on the screen in front of you. Do you understand? 
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Total time for the test sequence was about 8-10 min. Slides were shown 
for about 20 set each with lo-set intervals between slides. The experi- 
menter stood behind subjects changing the slides and recording responses. 
Each subject received the prize he had chosen. There was no feedback 
to the subjects concerning their performance during the test sequence. 
Each subject saw the slides in the following order; .4, .2, .7, 3, .3, .75, .l, 
.2, .5, .6, .25, .8, .4, and .2 red. 
Results and Discussion 
The data were analyzed in terms of the absolute difference between 
mean scores of subjects’ responses and the actual proportion for a given 
slide. These error values were averaged over all slides or different groups 
of slides, in the different analyses. A different measure of accuracy was 
used for some analyses which was based on the number of correct answers 
(direct hits) . 
Age and accuracy. Average errors per subject were computed across 
the 14 trials. CA was found to be a significant variable (F = 7.0, df = 
2,49, p < .02). Only the difference between the CA 5 and 7 year groups 
was significant (t = 2.33, p < .02), and the older children performed 
more accurately. The mean errors per age group were .133, .104, and .089 
for the CA 5, 6, and 7 groups, respectively. All age groups performed 
considerably better than at chance level for the task. The average error 
expected for randomly determined responding would be .354. 
Stimulus type and accuracy. The stimuli were grouped into high (> .7), 
middle (.4-.6), and low (<.3) proportion red dots, and an analysis of 
variance with repeated measures on one factor was performed. The differ- 
ence between these stimulus groupings was significant (F = 3.3, df = 
2,33, p < .05), with more errors on the high proportion group than the 
middle (t = 7.5, df = 24, p < .Ol) and the low (t = 9.3, df = 24, p < 
.Ol). These results are shown in Fig. 2. The interaction variance was 
not significant. If subjects actually based their judgments on the propor- 
tion of both exhibited colors there would be no apparent reason for the 
disparity between performance on the high and low proportions. One 
possible explanation for the difference is that subjects were attending 
only to the red dots. As the number of red dots increased so did the 
difficulty in judging their numerosity. It may be that attention strategies 
are important even for such relatively simple estimation tasks. 
In the above analyses of slide type effects only the randomly arranged 
configuration of the 2 red slides was included. In an analysis of vari- 
ance, repeated measure design, no differences were found among the 
three .2 stimulus configurations. When a direct hit analysis was applied 
to the data the effect of slide type was significant (P = 9.52, df = 4, 












FIG. 2. Mean error as a function of slide type for each age level. 
p < 0.5). The “X” design accounted for 4376, the random design 38% 
and the, block design 19% of the direct hits. Although it would be diffi- 
cult to make any strong conclusions with regard to field complexity and 
judgmental difficulty from a sample of three slides, the results suggest 
that this variable deserves additional research. 
Response distribution. It is usually assumed that the proportion of 
responses is distributed similarly among various experimental groups in 
a decision-making situation. The data of this study indicate that this 
assumption is not met when subjects are compared at the CA levels 
tested here. The proportion of total responses in each response category 
is shown in Fig. 3. The slides were grouped into high, medium, and low 
proportion red, and a chi-square goodness-of-fit between CA groups was 
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FIG. 3. Response distributions for each age level. 
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7 (X2 = 13.32, df = 2, p < .OOl) and CA 6 and 7 (X2 = 14.64, df = 2, 
p < .OOl). 
Conservatism. Response conservatism refers to the tendency of both 
high and low stimuli to be judged towards the middle of the response 
scale rather than the extremes. To measure the degree of conservatism, 
the number of responses in the two response classes adjacent to the correct 
response class and away from the middle, was compared to the number 
of responses in the two response classes adjacent to the correct class but 
towards the middle of the response range. A group is considered con- 
servative if the number of responses towards the middle is significantly 
greater than the number of responses away from the middle. This analysis 
was performed using the .2, .4, .6, and .8 stimuli for each age group 
separately. 
Both the CA 5 and CA 6 year groups showed significant conservatism 
(X2 = 9.8, df = 1, p < .Ol; X2 = 12.04, df = 1, p < .Ol, respectively), 
while the CA 7 year group did not. When subjects were divided into high 
and low performance groups (median break on overall error score), the 
high performance group was significantly less conservative than the low 
performance group (x? = 4.3, df = 1, p < .05). Because of the small num- 
ber of 5-year-olds above the median and the low number of 7-year-olds 
below the median, it was possible to test high versus low performance 
with age held constant only for the 6-year-olds. The high performers were 
not conservative while the low group was conservative (X2 = 20.25, df = 
1, p < 991) for the CA 6 group. The difference between the two groups 
was significant (X2 = 13.32, df = 1, p < .OOl). When the medians of the 
5- and 7-year-olds were used to determine within-age high and low per- 
formance groups, differences were not significant. 
It seems then, that response conservatism and performance level are 
related. Age differences cannot adequately account for the obtained 
differences while performance levels can. It is not clear, however, whether 
conservatism determines performance or those who do not perform well 
are more conservative. 
Relation to standard measures of ability and achievement. The sub- 
jects had been administered the Kuhlmann-Anderson Intelligence Test 
6 months prior to the experiment. An analysis of covariance between 
task performance and IQ scores for all ages showed a significant com- 
ponent independent from that measured by IQ (F = 14.1, df = 1,29, 
p < .OOl). 
The subjects in first and second grade had also been given the Stan- 
ford-Binet Achievement Test. Correlations between the subtests and 
task scores are shown in Table 2. It should be noted that these are cor- 
relations with errors, not accuracy; positive relations are therefore in- 
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TABLE 2 
CORRELATION BETWEEN STANFORD-BINET ACHIEVEMENT SUBTESTS AND AVWRAGE 
ERROR ON ESTIMATION TASK AS A FUNCTION OB AGE; 
Achievement subtesk 
CA level Ll L2 L3 Al 
5 years a na na 
6 years “Y4” -.20 -.29 -yz3 
7 years -.09 -.14 + .16 $.38 
a na = not available. 
dicated by negative correlations. The four subtests used were word mean- 
ing (L 1)) paragraph meaning (L 2)) language (L 3)) and arithmetic 
(A 1). None of the correlations reached significance. The lack of signif- 
icant correlations for the language subtests is consistent with the original 
purpose to control the language-dependent aspects of cognitive function- 
ing in this setting. 
Additional, analyses. An analysis of variance between age, sex, and 
average error showed no significant differences for sex (F = 3.21, df = 
1,46) or with respect to interaction variance (F = 1.83, df = 4,46). An 
analysis of variance between morning and afternoon performances was 
not significant (F < 1). 
EXPERIMENT II 
Developmental trends in estimation performance were established in 
Experiment I. Experiment II investigates the developmental changes in 
ability to use those estimates in the formation and revision of quantita- 
tive inferences. A set of four tasks was given to CA groups of 6, 7, and 
8 years to measure these abilities. Task 1 required subjects to estimate 
the proportion of red and green boxes appearing in a visual display. In 
Task 2, subjects were asked to estimate the proportion of red and green 
balls that would be found in a displayed set of closed red and green 
boxes, if every green box contained a green ball and every red box con- 
tained a red ball. Tasks 3 and 4 differed in that red boxes contained 
varying proportions of red and green balls, while the green boxes still 
contained only green balls. 
The specific hypotheses tested were: (1) children are able to adjust 
their estimates in the correct direction, at a level superior to chance; 
(2) the degree to which subjects accurately adjust their estimates to 
match the altered stimulus displays is a function of CA; (3) high per- 
formance subjects exhibit significantly less conservatism than low per- 
formance subjects; and (4) attention strategies or characteristics are 
important determiners of performance levels. 
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Method 
Subjects. Forty-one subjects enrolled in the same private school as in 
Experiment I served as subjects. The composition of the three age groups 
was as follows: CA 6.1, 9 males and 4 females; CA 7.2, 6 males and 7 
males; and CA 8.1, 7 males and 8 females. All were at the normal grade 
level except for two who were advanced one grade level each. Eight of 
the CA 6.1, 8 of the CA 7.2, and 13 of the CA 8.1 groups had partici- 
pated in Experiment I, 9 months earlier. 
Stimulus materials. The stimuli consisted of pictures of arrays of closed 
red and green boxes (test slides) or opened red and green boxes (clue 
slides). Each of five different test slides consisted of 48 closed boxes 
differing in the proportion of red and green boxes present. The color of 
the boxes was randomly determined within the limitations of the specific 
proportions. Each of the clue slides consisted of 24 open green boxes or 
24 open red boxes. Open green boxes always contained green balls, while 
the proportion of red balls in open red boxes varied with the series. The 
various types of ‘test” and “clue” slides are shown in Table 3. Slides 
were projected onto a screen about 12 ft away from the subjects. 
Response materials. The response apparatus from Experiment I was 
used. In order for the subject to be able to match the proportions de- 
manded in this setting, the picture appearing in the viewer showed either 
10 columns of closed boxes or 10 columns of colored balls. Once again 
there were 11 possible responses for the apparatus. 
Procedure. The subjects were tested individually. Instructions for the 
use of the response apparatus were the same as in the first experiment. 
The subjects were then told that in this game they were to make their 
picture have just as many red and green boxes as the picture on the 
screen in front of them. They were allowed to choose a prize to work 
for during t’he session. Prizes were candy bars and small toys, and were 
given them at the end of the entire session. They were told that they 
should do their best in order to obtain the selected prize. 
The first series consisted of 10 test slides, which were persented in 
order: .5, l.O! -25, .75, 0, .75, .25, 1.0, 0, and 5 red closed boxes. Total 
time for test sequence was 2-3 min; pictures were shown for 10 set with 
about 5-set intervals between presentations. 
For the second series, the picture in the viewer was changed from 
columns of boxes to columns of balls. It was then indicated to the sub- 
jects that hereafter they were to guess the number of red and green balls 
they would find in the red and green closed boxes they were to be shown. 
In order to help them guess, each series showed two clue slides simul- 
taneous with the test slide; one indicated the contents of the red boxes, 
the other the contents of the green boxes. For the second series the clue 
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TABLE 3 
“CLUE” AND “TEST” SLIDE PROPORTIONS FOR ALL TASKS 
Visual display elements 
Boxes Balls 
Task Red Green Red Green 
Task 1 
Test slide 1 48 0 - - 
Test slide 2 36 12 - - 
Test slide 3 24 24 - - 
Test slide 4 12 36 - 
Test slide 5 0 48 - 
Task 2 
Test slides 1-5 Same as above Same as above - - 
Clue slide 1 24 0 34 0 
Clue slide 4 0 24 0 24 
Task 3 
Test slides 1-5 Same as above Same as above - - 
Clue slide 2 24 0 12 12 
Clue slide 4 0 24 0 24 
Task 4 
Test slides l-5 Same as above Same as above - - 
Clue slide 3 24 0 6 18 
Clue slide 4 0 24 0 24 
slides indicated a perfect one-to-one correspondence between color of 
box and ball. 
Series 3 differed from Series 2 with respect to the red box clue slide. 
On this series half of the red boxes contained red balls and the remain- 
ing contained green balls, while the green boxes all contained green balls. 
Once the change had been indicated to the subjects and they had ver- 
balized the change, the same test slide sequence as for Series 1 and 2 
was shown, in the same order. 
On the fourth series the red box clue slide changed again. This time 
only one-fourth of the red boxes contained red balls, the remainder of 
the boxes being filled by green balls. The change was indicated to the 
subject and he was again asked to verbalize it. The test slide sequence 
was the same for this series as it was for the others, and in the same 
order. 
There was no feedback to subjects concerning performance during the 
test sequences. 
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Results and Discussion 
The four series in Experiment II formed an interrelated sequence. In 
order to obtain a pure measure of the amount of error subjects make in 
using one-to-one correspondence (Series 2) it is necessary to subtract 
the amount of error due to the estimation alone (Series 1). Series 2, 3, 
and 4 differ from one another in that the likelihood of finding a red ball 
in a red box becomes smaller with each series. The amount of information 
the subject obtains from the changing clue slide determines the degree to 
which his estimates are altered. By comparing the responses in successive 
series we may obtain a measure of how much the subject changed his 
estimates in accord with the new information. 
Age and accuracy. Analysis of variance between total average error per 
subject and age for the first series showed no significant differences. This 
finding was in agreement with the first experiment, in which 6- and 
7-year-olds did not differ on this same measure. 
Analysis of variance between age and average error for the one-to-one 
correspondence series showed a significant difference (F = 6.50, df = 2,38, 
p < .Ol). Subsequent tests indicated that there was a significant mean 
difference between CA groups 6 and 7 (t = 3.60, p < .Ol) and 6 and 8 (t = 
2.93, p < .Ol). The difference between the error distributions for the 
first two series when grouped according to age and slide type showed no 
significance, for a chi-square goodness of fit. When the amount of error 
due to the first series was subtracted from the second series error there 
were no longer any significant age differences. It may be concluded that 
any significant differences on one-to-one correspondence tasks are not 
due to CA ability differences in the use of one-to-one correspondence, 
but rather its combination with the slight developmental differences in 
ability to form simple estimates. 
Stimulus type and ‘accuracy. In order to perform the third and fourth 
series tasks, a subject must attend to the fact that a clue slide has 
changed from simple one-to-one correspondence, and shift his estimates 
accordingly. The test slide showing only red boxes provides an index of 
subjects’ adjustment to these changes in clue slide. In Series 4, where 
the clue slide contains only one-fourth red balls in red boxes, only two 
subjects estimated that all the closed red boxes would contain red balls. 
In other words, subjects clearly adjusted their estimates. In Series 3, 
however, such an adjustment was made far more frequently by older 
children than younger ones. Both the difference between 6- and 7-year- 
olds (x2 = 8.25, df = 1, p < .Ol) and 6- and 8-year-olds (x2 = 4.51, 
df = 1, p < .05) was significant. About 42% of the 6-year-olds estimated 
that the closed red boxes would contain all red balls despite the clue 
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TABLE 4 
ANALYSIS OF 1.0 RED SLIDE RESPONSE FOR SERIES 3 AND 4 
CA level 
Task 3 Task 4 
All red Adjusted to All red Adjusted to 
responses cue change responses cue change 
6 years 11 15 1 23 
7 years 2 24 0 26 
8 years 5 2.i 1 29 
slides, while 8% of the 7-year-olds and 16% of the 8-year-olds responded 
in this fashion. Table 4 represents these data. 
Since the clue slide for the closed green boxes never changed, the proper 
response to the all green test slide was all green balls. The analysis of 
the all green test slides showed an interesting trend. As Table 5 shows, a 
significant proportion of subjects did not respond properly to that slide. 
This type of error might be called overgeneralization of cue uncertainty, 
since subjects adjusted their responses to all red and all green test slides 
in parallel fashion. The difference between the 6- and 8-year-olds is 
significant (X2 = 4.71, df = 1, p < .05), the older subjects performing 
poorer than the younger on Series 3. The difference between performances 
for the 8-year-olds on Series 3 and 4 is significant (X2 = 7.12, df = 1, 
p < .02). This overgeneralization is not simply associated with attending 
to the uncertainty of the red clue slide, for the 7-year-olds were able to 
attend to the all red case as well as the 8-year-olds but did not exhibit 
the same pattern of overgeneralization. A possible explanation is that 
6-year-olds did not attend to the uncertainty at all, while the 7- and 
8-year-olds did. The difference between the 7- and 8-year-olds might 
be that the CA 8 focused on just the red colored clue slides, thereby not 
attending to the all green clue slides. These hypotheses cannot be un- 
equivocally evaluated from the present data. 
TABLE 5 
PROPORTION OF OVERGENER.~LIZED RESPOKSES ON ALL GREEN TEST SLIDES FOR EACH 
CA LEVEL ON T.~SKS 3 AND 4 
CA level 
Task 3 Task 4 
Over- Over- 
generalized Correct generalized Correct 
6 years 4 22 6 21 
7 years 6 20 8 18 
8 years 12 1s 3 27 
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If a subject understood the elements of the experimental task and 
attended to those elements, responses to the 1.0 and .O slides in Series 1 
and 3 should be perfect. In Series 3 and 4, the same slides provide us 
with more information about whether the subject is attending to the 
uncertain nature of the clue, than his ability to revise his estimates. In- 
cluding both the 1.0 and .O test slides in an analysis of estimate-revision 
performance might be inappropriate. 
After removing the 1.0 and .O test trials from the analysis of error, 
performance on the remaining slides shows a significant difference be- 
tween the 6- and 8-year-olds (t = 2.36, p < .05). When the all red and 
all green slides are included in the analysis no developmental trends 
appear. It would seem that the overgeneralization error, found primarily 
in the 8-year-olds, and not found in the 6-year-olds, would have ob- 
scured the developmental differences. 
It was hypothesized that attention would be a major variable in the 
developmental differences. The preceding analyses of the all red and all 
green response trials have shown to what degree and in what direction 
these differences tend. In the first study, it was found that the degree of 
attention focussing could explain some of the developmental differences 
in response distributions. In this study we have a similar finding in that 
attention focussing is able to account for the patterns of errors across 
the age levels. Corroborative evidence was found in another study. 
Vurpillot (1968) studied eye scanning of picture stimuli and task per- 
formance in children at four age levels from 3-9 years. It was found that 
the subjects under 6 used limited scanning and made inappropriate 
judgments, while older children adopted a task-appropriate eye-scanning 
strategy and their performance was also better. 
Conservatism. Conservatism was measured in the same manner as in 
Experiment I. The only significant difference between age levels was that 
7-year-olds were significantly less conservative than 8-year-olds (x2 = 
3.95, df = 1, p < .Ol). Irrespective of age group, a significant difference 
was found between high and low performers on Series 2 responses (x* = 
3.68, df = 1, p < .Ol). When the same procedure of using the median as 
the cut-off point for high and low performers was used for the third and 
fourth series, no differences were found. However, if we use the same 
absolute value for the cut-off as was used in Experiment I (.llO) the 
difference between the degree of conservatism for the performance levels 
is significant (X2 = 21.04, df = 1, p < .OOl). This finding suggests that a 
subject could be conservative on one task and not so on another. In other 
words, conservatism seems to be related to the subjects’ understanding 
of the task and less to some type of pervasive cognitive style. Subse- 
quent testing is needed to substantiate these hypotheses. 
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Adjustment of estimates. Instead of determining the absolute error in 
judgment for the final two series, an analysis of whether the estimate of 
a subject was changed in the correct direction was undertaken. For ex- 
ample, if the subject’s responses for the .25 test slides in Series 2 aver- 
ages .35, then any response for that subject that is less than .35 is scored 
correct. The scores on Series 3 were used as a basis for evaluating the 
correctness of change for a response on Series 4. This method of analysis 
allows a subject who has a high average error to score well despite that 
average error value. In other words, it tests consistency of change rela- 
tive to a subject’s own estimates. 
The data are depicted for Task 4 in Fig. 4. There were no significant 
a LOW MIDDLE HIGH 
PROPORTIONS 
FIG. 4. Proportion of responses altered in the correct direction as a function of 
slide type for Task 4. 
differences with regard to age for Task 3 or 4. Any differences between 
slide types might be difficult to interpret because of the possible effect 
of response conservatism. More interesting than any differences between 
the groups is the fact that all age levels adjust their estimates in the 
correct direction at a level significantly above chance. In other words, 
although subjects might not extract all of the information from their 
clue slides, they are abIe to alter their estimates in the correct direction 
when faced with imperfectly weighted cues. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
It was hypothesized that children in the age range tested possessed a 
better than chance level of functioning on estimation and estimation- 
based inferences. This hypothesis was confirmed. It was further hy- 
pothesized that the CA range represented a period of change with respect 
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to the degree that subjects adhered to optimal models. This prediction 
was confirmed in the case of estimations and inferences about estimations 
when differences due to attention only were controlled. The hypothesis 
that significant changes would occur before the age of 7 was not con- 
clusively confirmed in the case of estimations. However, the performance 
of the 6-year-olds on the inference task showed t,hat the ability to adjust 
inferences or estimates must develop before 6. This finding casts some 
doubt on the position that young children are not capable of manipulat- 
ing numerical quantities in an abstract form. Further, it is usually ad- 
vanced that spatial reorganization interferes with the ability of a child 
to employ one-to-one correspondence and to exhibit conservation of 
quantity. In all of the estimation tasks subjects were required to make 
their responses via a highly ordered configuration, although the stimulus 
sets were presented in random arrays. The requirement of representa- 
tional reorganization did not interfere with the ability of subjects to per- 
form on the one-to-one correspondence task. 
One is tempted to relate these findings to certain aspects of Piaget’s 
theory. Flavell (1963) points out that Piaget dealt with the develop- 
ment of probability concepts in a series of experiments (p. 341). The 
conclusion is that preoperational children do not seem to differentiate 
between chance and nonchance or between the possible and the neces- 
sary. Although our study did not include an evaluation of the children’s 
development in terms of concrete operations, their CA would suggest 
they were not fully at t’his level; yet their performance indicated they 
could make this differentiation between the possible and the necessary. 
Since the relevant Piagetian issues are complicated and only marginally 
related to the major issue here, the matter will not be pressed further. 
Two elements of cognitive style were suggested by the first experiment 
and found to be of importance in the second experiment. The first was 
attention strategy, while the second was response conservatism. Both 
factors seem to warrant continued research. Some specific hypotheses 
that were suggested by this study were: (1) response conservatism is a 
function of the relation between the subject and his ability to cope with 
environmental tasks, and not a pervasive style or trait; and (2) when 
pre-ented proportion estimation tasks there is a developmental trend 
towards translating the problem into a numerosity judgment. 
Some problems in the analysis of quantitative estimation data were 
indicated. First, it cannot be assumed that the response distributions of 
young children can be equated. Secondly, it cannot be assumed t’hat 
since a stimulus set is varying only in some quantitative dimension, re- 
sponses will vary likewise. There can be significant qualitative shifts in 
response strategies with quantitative shifts in stimuli. 
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There is ample evidence in this study that young children are able to 
deal with uncertain situations requiring extralogical abilities. These tech- 
niques are assumed to develop because they are needed. However, at this 
point we have very little information about the limitations of instructing 
children in such techniques, or even about the degree to which such 
abilities are possessed at each age level. These issues are relevant to many 
forms of judgment processes, and should receive additional research. 
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